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ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF PROMISE OF MARRIAGE.
FEw questions have been presented to our courts of judicature
that have elicited more social discussion, or attracted more general
attention of the outside world, than the one we propose briefly to
consider.
"Marriage,"
observes Lord RoBERTSON, the distinguished
Scotch judge, "is a contract sui eners, and differing, in some
respects, from all other contracts, so that the rules of law which
are applicable in expounding and enforcing other contracts may
not apply to this. The contract of marriage is the most important of all human transactions. It is the very basis of the whole
fabric of civilized society. The status of marriage is Jurisgentium,
and the foundation of it, like that of -all other contracts, rests on
the consent of parties; but it differs from other contracts in this,
that the rights, obligations, or duties arising from it are not left
entirely to be regulated by the agreements of parties, but are to
a certain extent matters of municipal regulation, over which the
parties have no control by any declaration of their will; it confers the status of legitimacy on children born in wedlock with all
the consequential rights, duties, and privileges thence arising;
it gives rise to the relations of consanguinity and affinity; in
short, it pervades the whole system of civil society. Unlike
other'contracts, it cannot, in general, amongst civilized nations,
be dissolved by mutual consent; and it subsists in full force, even
although one bf the parties should be for ever rendered incapaVOL. XX.-5
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ble, as in the case of incurable insanity, or the like, from performing his part of the mutual contract. No wonder that the
rights, duties, and obligations arising from so impprtant a contract, should not be left to the discretion or caprice of the contracting parties, but should be regulated, in many important
particulars, by the laws of every civilized country :" Duntze v.
Levett, Ferg. 385, 397.
The distinction between marriage and ordinary contracts thus
forcibly pointed out, is approvingly quoted by Judge STORY, in

his Confl. Laws, §§ 109-111, and has often been considered an
eloquent exposition of the subject discussed.
Another Scotch judge, of no little renown, has observed,
Though the origin of marriage is contract, it is in a different
situation from all others :" 3 Eng. Ec. 505 ; Duntze v. Levett,
Ferg. 401; Gordon v. Pye, Ferg. 276, 339.
In the case of Jfaguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana 181, ROBERTSON,
C. J., of Kentucky, observes: "Marriage, though in one sense
a contract-because, being both stipulatory and consensual, it
cannot be valid without the spontaneous concurrence of two competdnt minds-is, nevertheless, sui generis, and unlike ordinary
or commercial contracts, is publici Juris, because it establishes
fundamental and most important domestic relations."
And in Rogers's Ec. Law, 2d ed., 595, it is said, "Marriage
is a contract; having its origin in the law of nature antecedent
to all civil institutions, but adopted by political society, and
charged thereby with various civil obligat;-nq. It is founded on
mutual consent, which is the essence of all contracts; and is
entered into by two persons of different sexes, with a view to
their mutual comfort and support, and for the procreation of
children." We have thus given the status and the responsibilities arising from the- marriage contract to aid us in discussing the
peculiar circumstances growing out of alliances of friendship and
of affection. The written law of almost every state and nation
has provided, in some mode or other, the means of granting
redress and compensation, in way of damages, for a breach
of the marriage contract as well as the breach of promise to
-narry.
We shall endeavor, in the space allotted to us, to consider the
rules of law governing such contracts, and to notice some peen-
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liar cases of breach of promise of marriage in the books and out
of them.
Upon reading and examining the various cases of breach of
promise to marry, and the motives which prompted the action of
the parties, one is forcibly reminded what the sapient and quaint
Hudibras declares, that
"Love is a fire, that burns and sparkles,
In men, as nat'rally as in charcoals."

This couplet was fully exemplified in a recent case tried in the
City Court of Brooklyn, before Judge NEILSON and a jury, in
October 1871. It is known as the Homan-Earle Case.
The plaintiff was a maid of some thirty years, and the defendant a widower, something over fifty. The plaintiff, like Gough's
parents, was poor but "very respectable," and a regular attendant and member of the same church with the defendant. The
minister of their church being one of the principal witnesses, the
case before and during the trial became tea-table talk among the
parishioners, at least, and among tonguesters generally. The
testimony adduced on the one side and the other showed that the
defendant began his attentions almost immediately after his wife's
death, and continued them for a period of several months, when
he was ascertained to be engaged in marriage to another person.
The case was interesting, as there was no express promise, and it
rested wholly upon circumstances-implied promises.
The learned judge in his charge says :-" The plaintiff herself
upon the stand says, and she has said to others, and said continually, and without, as far as I can judge, any disposition to
qualify that view of the case, 'he never asked me in words to
marry him, I never promised in words to do so.'"
Thus the question for the jury to consider was, whether the
minds of the contracting parties met, and concurred in reference
to the particular engagement.
The jury on this branch of the case were properly charged
that, if "all the circumstances taken together, words, attentions,
demonstrations, more or less earnest, assiduous and affectionate,
amounted to a declaration of an intent to marry her, to the
assurance that that was what he sought, was his conclusion, if he
intentionally led her so to understand it, and she in response
accepted that declaration, if there was a meeting of minds on
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that as an engagement between them, the implied contract necessary to sustain the action has been proved." This was charged
as a rule of law, and we hold properly so, on abundant authority:
Vide Button v. lMeCauley, 5 Abb. Pr. N. S. 29, Court of Appeals,
1867.
On the question of damage, the judge charged that the jury
were at liberty to consider "what the lady lost in being deprived
of the benefit of the marriage, of the association, protection, easy
life, and whatever was involved :" Vide Kniffin v. .uleconnell, 30
N. Y. Rep. 285. So also, "her disappointment, mortification,
andi pain (if any), sorrow, suffering, all being elements entering
into this question of damage."
There have been so many adjudications in New York and other
states, holding that long-bestowed and particular attentions having
apparently an honorable object, furnish sufficient evidence from
which the jury may imply a promise of marriage, that it would
almost seem idle to consider it. On this point, vide Southard
v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 254; Wells v. Padgett, 8 Barb. 323; Hubbard v. Bonesteel, 16 Barb. 360; Willard v. Stone, 7 Cow. 22;
Hutton v. 2Vhunsell, 3 Salk. 16; .Hotchkins v. Hfodge, 38 Barb.
117; 1 Pars. on Cont. 545; Button v. McCauley, 5 Abb. Pr.
N. S. 29. These authorities support the proposition that a promise to marry may be implied from circumstances, and thus uphold the charge on that p6int of Judge NgILSON in the HomanEarle Case. And by the Statute of New York, promises to marry
need not be in writing: 3 Rev. Stat. 5th ed. 221. It being a
civil contract, no particular form of solemnization is necessary:
Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl, 8 Abb. Pr. 5; .lfereein v. Andrus, 10
Wend. 461; 8 Barb. 323. This case was free from any doubtful
or technical questions; the implied promise appeared to be proved,
and the refusal to fulfil was shown in that the defendant had
married another lady.
A very interesting case and one which involved many fine
points of law, was that of Frost v. .night, L. R. 5 Exch. 322,
tried in the Court of Exchequer 1870, which was an action for
breach of contract to marry upon the following facts: The defendant, as it was shown, promised to marry the plaintiff upon his
father's death; before the death of the father the defendant
refused to fulfil his promise or to be bound any longer thereby.
At the trial the promise and breach were proved, as well as that
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the father of the defendant was yet living. An elaborate brief
was presented by the plaintiff which cited many cases in support
of the proposition, that the declaration of the defendant that he
would be bound no longer by his promise was such a breach of
his promise as to entitle the plaintiff to treat the contract as
broken, and to maintain her action for the breach of contract
without waiting for the death of defendant's father: ifoclhster v.'
De La Tour, 2 E. & B. 678; Avery v. Bowden, 5 E. & B. 714;
s. c. in error, 6 E. & B. 953; Danube Railway Co. v. Xenos, 11
C. B. N. S. 152; '18 0. B. N. S. 825; Phillvots v. Ilvans, 5 M.
& W. 475; .Rileyv. McClure, 4 Ex. 845; Short v. Stone, 8 Q.
B. 858; Lovelock v. Franklyn, 8 Q. B. 871; Crabtree v. .Tessersmith, 19 Iowa 182 ; Lamoreaux v. Rolfe, 86 N. H. 183; 2
Smith's Lead. Cas. (6th ed.) 17, 39; Leake on Cont. 462; Chitty
on Cont. (8th ed.) 643. The defendant distinguished the cases
relied on by the plaintiff, and cited among others Bowdell v. Parsons, 10 East 859; Box v. Day, 1 Wills. 59.
KELLY, C. B., in delivering the judgment of the court said:
"The first question is whether this contract is really such that
it iscapable of being broken before the death of the father has
taken place ? Nothing can'be more certain, as a matter of fact,
than that a promise to marry upon an event which has not yet
happened, is not broken by the defendant declaring that he will
not perform his promise. If it can be called a breach at all, it is
a promissory or prospective breach only, a possible breach which
may never occur, and not an actual breach."
The learned judge then discusses the question and cites among
others the case of .foehster v. De La Tour, 1 W. R. 469, which
was a case where the defendant promised to employ the plaintiff
as courier on and from June 1st, for three months, then next ensuing, and having, before the month of June arrived, given notice
to the plaintiff that he would not perform his contract, the plaintiff
brought his action. The judgment of the court, as delivered by
Lord CAMPBELL, after first correctly stating the question, except
that the statement assumes, or rather asserts, that the renunciation
of the contract was a breach of it, proceeds to refer to the case of
Short v. Stone, 8 Q. T. 358, treating it as a case of a promise to
marry within a reasonable time after request; and then refers to
the cases of Fordv. Tiley, 6 B. & C. 325, and Bowdell v. Parsons,
10 East 359, as authorities in favor of the plaintiff. Short v. Stone
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was a case where the defendant promised to marry the plaintiff
within a, reasonable time after request, and the court held, that,
upon a promise to marry the plaintiff, it was a breach to marry
another woman. After briefly reviewing the cases of Ford v. Tiley
and Bowdell v. Parsons, which were cases arising upon breaches
of contract, the learned judge remarks: "These cases are no
authority at all for the proposition that, a declaration by the
defendant that, when tile event shall have happened upon which
he has promised to do an act, he will not perform his promise,
amounts, in itself, to a present breach of the promise, upon which
an action may be at once maintained."
Cases further commented upon by the court, were The Danube
Co. v. Xenos, 11 0. B. N. S. 152; Leight v. Paterson, 2 Moore
588; Phillpotts v. Evans, 5 M. & W. 475; Startup v. cortazzi,
2 C. TM. &R. 165; Biplell v. MeClure, 4 Exch. 845; which were
actions arising out of contracts, and the court held in effect
in those cases that a contract is not broken by defendant's
previous declaration that he would not perform. In the last
case cited PARKE, B., observes: "It was contended for the defendant that to constitute a breach of the contract a refusal at
any time was insufficient; that it must be a refusal after the
arrival of the cargo; and that the supposed refusal in July, long
before the contract to buy became absolute, was no breach, and
nothing more than an expression of an intention to break the
contract, not final, and capable of being retracted; and we think
that if the jury had been told that a refusal before the arrival of
the cargo was a breach, it would have been inaccurate. We think
that point rightly decided in Philpotts v. Evans."
"But when we consider the effect" of this doctrines," observes
KE.LLY, C. B., "if applied to a promise of marriage in relation
to the question of damage, we find. that it is to substitute for the
contract which the parties have really entered into another contract which they have never entered into and never contemplated,
the damages resulting from the breach of the one being totally
different from those which may be sustained from the breach of
the other ;" and thus he gives the gist of his opinion: "It appears
to me, therefore, quite obvious that it would be a self-evident
untruth to say that the plaintiff has sustained damages from a
breach of the defendant's contract to marry her at the death of
a man who is now alive." He concludes, from the cases cited,
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that the defendant, by renouncing the contract, has entitled the
plaintiff to elect whether she will accept the renunciation, thus
putting an end to the contract, and bring a special action on the
case (in tort) for the wrong done by the act ,of renouncing, or,
whether she will treat the renunciation as a nullity, and insisting
upon the contract, await the death of the father, when, if the
promise be not performed, she may bring her action for the breach,
which will then and not until then have been really committed.
Thus holding to a different rule in this case than in other actions
where a certain tling is to be done upon the happening of a certain event, as in ffoclter v. De La Tour. On the electi6n of the
plaintiff in this case the rule was made absolute to aprest the
judgment, and judgment was thus given for the defendant.
MARTIN, B., thought judgment should have been given .for the
plaintiff, leaving the defendant to bring error.
In the recent case of Burtis v. Thompson, 42 N. Y. 246,
where the parties entered into an engagement to marry"' in the
fall," the defendant announced to the plaintiff in October, that
he would not perform the contract. GRovE.R, J., held, that an
action commenced immediately was not prematurely brought.
An action for the breach of promise will lie at once, upon a positive refusal to perform a contract of marriage, althoug the time
specified for the performance has not arrived. Thus concurring
in the reasoning of the court in Hoehter v. De La Tour.
We may say in passing that it is well settled, that a promise to
marry cannot be specifically enforced. Unlike actions arising
upon other contracts, the suit can only -be for damages caused by
the breach of the promise: Olheney v. Arnold (Court of Appeals),
15 N. Y. 345.
In the important case of Blattmacher v. Saal, 29 Barb. 22
(vide 7 Abb. Pr. 409), where the defendant was married at the
time of the promise and deceived the plaintiff by representing
that he was unmarried, it *as held, that the agreement was not
illegal on her part, and the defendant's disqualification to perform
such promise was no defence; he should not be allowed to take
advantage of his own wrong. An averment of marriage to
another, dispenses with the request to marry, tlot gh the promise
is so laid; and it is not necessary to aver that the other person
is still living, as was obliged to be shown in the case of Short v.
Stone, 8 Q. B. 358. Nor would it be necessary to a'lege in the
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bill that the defendant knew his representations to be false: Blattmacher v. Saal, 29 Barb. 22.
It has sometimes been asked whether a man can maintain an
action for such breach. Although it might be considered unmanly for a man to bring an action for breach of promise to
'marry, as such actions are uncommon, yet there have been actions of that kind brought, and the man would be entitled to
such damage as he may be able to show himself to have sustained, as appears by the case of Harrisonv. Cage, 1 Ld. Raym.
386. And loss of time and expense incurred in preparation for
the marriage would be the grounds of damage directly incidental
to the breach: Smith v. Sherman, 4 Cush. 408. But evidence
of impaired health would be inadmissible, unless that be alleged
in the plaint as special damage resulting from the breach, as
shown in the case of Bedell v. Powell, 13 Barb. 183.
In the peculiar case of Conrad v. Williams, 6 Hill 444,
where it was shown to have been a promise to marry the plaintiff
if he ever married, it was held to be a void promise, as being in
restraint of marriage. On the other hand a promise of marriage
made after seduction has been effected, and in consequence thereof,
is not thereby rendered invalid. It is not liable to the objection
that it encourages immorality either, because the wrong has been
already perpetrated, as shown in the case of H1otehkins v. JHodge,
38 Barb. 117; 2 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 440. If seduction be
accomplished by means of promise of mtrriage on the part of the
seducer, a consent of the female to *marryhim, amounting to a
mutual promise on her part to marry, may be implied: People v.
Kenyon, 5 Park. Cr. 254; Southard v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 254.
Compare .Liefman v. Soloman, 7 Abb. Pr. 409, n. In cases
where seduction is shown, it is always held, that that circumstance should be regarded as an aggravation of the breach of
promise to marry, authorizing the jury to give an increased verdict: Wells v. Padgett, 8 Barb. 323.
And in all such actions any misconduct showing that the plaintiff would be ahi unfit companion in married life, may be given in
evidence in mitigation of damages: Button v. 31eCauley, 5 Abb.
Pr. N.S. 29; Palmer v. Andrews, 7 Wend. 142; 2 Am. Law
Reg. N.S. 120-440. But it is not competent for the defendant
to prove, even in mitigation of damages, that on one or more
particular occasions the plaintiff drank intoxicating liquors to

